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Abstract The major predecessor to Ringen’s and my own
efforts to measure democratic quality in terms of the purpose
of democracy is Robert Dahl’s seminal book Polyarchy
(1971). Measuring the quality of democracy requires two
prior judgments: (1) making sure that, in terms of institu-
tional characteristics, a country is sufficiently democratic,
and that, as a minimum, it has universal suffrage, and (2) that
its democracy has been uninterrupted for a minimum number
of years. To an important extent, higher democratic quality
can be attributed to institutional characteristics of consensus
democracy, especially proportional representation.
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Stein Ringen’s article is a most welcome contribution to the
comparative analysis of democracy. Great strides have been
made in the measurement of democracy as a decision-
making system. In addition to the Polity project (now Polity
IV), the annual ratings by Freedom House deserve to be
mentioned. But, as Ringen correctly points out, the
measurement of democratic quality in terms of the purpose
of democracy has been neglected.
This neglect is surprising because the most basic
definition of democracy is not only government by the
people but also, as stated famously by President Abraham
Lincoln, for the people—that is, in accordance with the
people’s preferences and serving their interests. It is also
implied in Robert A. Dahl’s eight criteria for defining and
measuring democracy in his seminal book Polyarchy
(1971). His first seven criteria have to do with institutional
features of democracy like universal suffrage, universal
eligibility for public office, free elections, and freedom of
expression and association—similar to the criteria used by
Polity and Freedom House. But his eighth criterion goes
beyond institutional rules to the purpose of decision-
making: public policies that are responsive to the voters’
preferences.
Dahl also differs from Polity and Freedom House in
making more distinctions among the stable and consolidat-
ed democracies. Both Polity and Freedom House place
almost all of these democracies in the same category with
the highest ranking. In one respect, Dahl’s approach is
similar in that he ranks a large number of countries from the
highest type of democracy to the lowest type of non-
democracy. But there are three contrasts. First, Dahl
explicitly uses his crucial eighth criterion to rank his
countries. Second, he uses a more differentiated scale with
thirty-one categories. Third, and most important, at the
democratic end of the scale he sees clear differences of
quality among thirty-two stable democracies, ranging from
high of 1 to a low of 9. In effect, this is a separate nine-
point scale indicating different degrees of quality among
established democratic systems. To give a few examples, as
of 1969, the highest ranking is given to Belgium, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden; Canada, Japan, and
New Zealand are in the middle; and Colombia and
Venezuela are at the bottom.
Ringen credits me with doing the “pioneering work”—
praise that I appreciate, but I think that Dahl must be
regarded as the major predecessor to both of us. I should
also mention that, although I did show qualitative differ-
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ences among the thirty-six stable democracies in my
Patterns of Democracy (1999), I did not attempt to
construct an index similar to Dahl’s or Ringen’s nine-
point scales. Instead, I used Dahl’s index, in addition to
several other indicators of democratic quality (like women’s
rights, socio-economic equality, and satisfaction with
democracy) to demonstrate significant differences between
majoritarian and consensus democracies. If I prepare an
updated edition of Patterns of Democracy, I cannot use
Dahl’s index any longer because by now it is more than
40 years old. Fortunately, Ringen’s index will be an
excellent up-to-date replacement.
I would like to add two points to Ringen’s argument.
First, it is significant that all of the countries ranked by
Ringen according to their degree of democratic quality are
stable democracies. This choice, I believe, is not an
arbitrary one. Measuring the quality of democracy is the
third step in a three-step judgment. We have to begin by
establishing (1) that the countries we are interested in are
sufficiently democratic in terms of regime and institutional
characteristics to justify being called democracies, and (2)
that their democracy is firmly established. For the latter
requirement, I used a nineteen-year criterion in Patterns of
Democracy, that is, uninterrupted democracy for at least
19 years. (My initial rule was based on 20 years—a
preferable round number—but I did not want to exclude
India, the world’s largest democracy.) Shorter or longer
periods can also be defended, although, in my opinion,
anything shorter than 15 years is questionable. As of 2010,
all of the countries ranked by Ringen, except Mexico,
satisfy the twenty-year criterion.
For the first step of judging the degree of institutional
democracy, I am at least partly sympathetic to the view of
Polity that democracy is a matter of degree and that there is
a continuous scale from the worst autocracy at one end to
the best democracy at the other. I also strongly believe,
however, that we need to establish a threshold below which
a country cannot be regarded as democratic. For instance,
an essential condition for democracy—a necessary, al-
though obviously not sufficient condition—is universal
suffrage. This basic fact is often disregarded, for instance,
when in his 1993 inaugural address, President Bill Clinton
called the United States “the world’s oldest democracy,”
although universal suffrage was not firmly established until
the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. Scholars
often commit the same error. I must confess to have been
rather lenient, and perhaps too lenient, in this respect when
I treated Switzerland, Australia, and the United States as
stable democracies from 1945 on, although women in pre-
1971 Switzerland, Aboriginees in pre-1962 Australia, and
many blacks in pre-1965 America did not have the right to
vote.
I am not sure where exactly the minimum threshold for
institutional democracy should be drawn. My main argu-
ment is that there must be such a minimum, below which a
country does not qualify as a democracy, and that it does
not make sense to discuss the quality of democracy in
countries whose institutions and rules are not sufficiently
democratic.
My second point, much more briefly, is that institutional
democracy is not only a prerequisite for judging democratic
quality, but that institutions and quality are related to each
other. Majoritarian and consensus democracy, both defined
in institutional terms, exhibit different degrees of demo-
cratic quality. The most important institution of consensus
democracy responsible for delivering this higher democratic
quality for the people—in particular, better women’s
representation in government and higher voter turnout in
elections—is proportional representation (PR). Significant-
ly, the five countries in the top three of Ringen’s nine
categories of relative democratic quality—the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—all have PR
elections. PR is therefore both a strong influence for
democratic quality and can itself be regarded as qualita-
tively superior to majoritarian elections.
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